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Abstract
Just prior to the Copenhagen climate summit, China pledged to cut its carbon intensity by
40-45% by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels to help to reach an international climate
change agreement at Copenhagen or beyond. This raises the issue of whether such a
pledge is ambitious or just represents business as usual. To put China’s climate pledge
into perspective, this paper examines whether this proposed carbon intensity goal for
2020 is as challenging as the energy-saving goals set in the current 11th five-year
economic blueprint, to what extent it drives China’s emissions below its projected
baseline levels, and whether China will fulfill its part of a coordinated global
commitment to stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere
at the desirable level. Given that China’s pledge is in the form of carbon intensity, the
paper shows that GDP figures are even more crucial to the impacts on the energy or
carbon intensity than are energy consumption and emissions data by examining the
revisions of China’s GDP figures and energy consumption in recent years. Moreover, the
paper emphasizes that China’s proposed carbon intensity target not only needs to be seen
as ambitious, but more importantly it needs to be credible. Finally, it is concluded with a
suggestion that international climate change negotiations need to focus on 2030 as the
targeted date to cap the greenhouse gas emissions of the world’s two largest emitters in a
legally binding global agreement.
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1. Introduction
Since launching its open-door policy and economic reforms in late 1978, China has
experienced spectacular economic growth, and hundreds of millions of the Chinese
people have been raised out of poverty. In this course, however, China has been heavily
dependent on dirty-burning coal to fuel its rapidly growing economy. This has given rise
to unprecedented environmental pollution and health risks. On top of these environmental
stresses, projected global climate change is expected to pose additional threats to China in
the foreseeable future.
Given the fact that China is already the world’s largest carbon emitter and its emissions
continue to rise rapidly in line with its industrialization and urbanization, China is seen to
have greater capacity, capability and responsibility. The country is facing great pressure
both inside and outside international climate negotiations to be more ambitious in
combating global climate change (Zhang, 2009 and 2010a,b).
Clearly, China, from its own perspective can not afford to and, from an international
perspective, is not meant to continue on the conventional path of encouraging economic
growth at the expense of the environment. Instead, a range of environmental concerns
and pressures has sparked China’s determination to improve energy efficiency and to
increase the use of clean energy in order to help its transition to a low-carbon economy
(Zhang, 2010c).
Improvements in energy efficiency are particularly important in reducing energy
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions as they offer win-win options at a relatively
low cost compared to other options. China achieved a quadrupling of its GDP with only a
doubling of energy consumption between 1980 and 2000 (Zhang, 2003). On the trends of
the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. EIA (2004) estimated that China’s CO2 emissions were not
expected to catch up with the world’s largest carbon emitter until 2030. However,
China’s energy use had surged since the turn of this century, almost doubling between
2000 and 2007. Despite similar rates of economic growth, the rate of growth in China’s
energy use during this period (9.74% per year) has been more than twice that of the
previous two decades (4.25% per year) (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2009).
This change in energy intensity was responsible for an increase of 20 million tons of
carbon (MtC) emissions during the period 2001-2007, compared with a reduction of 576
MtC over the period 1980-2000 (Zhang, 2010c).1 As a result, China became the world’s
largest carbon emitter in 2007.
To reverse this trend, China has incorporated for the first time in its five-year economic
plan an input indicator as a constraint – requiring that energy use per unit of GDP be cut
by 20% during the 11th five-year period running from 2006 to 2010 (The State Council,
2006). This is widely considered an important step towards building a “harmonious
society” through “scientific development”. Just prior to the Copenhagen climate summit,
1
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contributions of inter-fuel switching, energy conservation, economic growth and
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China further pledged to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45% by 2020 relative to its 2005
levels in order to help to reach an international climate change agreement at Copenhagen
or beyond.
This paper focuses on assessing China’s proposed climate intensity target for 2020.2 To
assess whether this target just represents business as usual, the paper first examines
whether the proposed carbon intensity goal for 2020 is as challenging as the energysaving goals set in the current 11th five-year economic blueprint, to what extent it drives
China’s emissions below its projected baseline levels, and whether China does its part as
required in order to fulfill a coordinated global commitment to stabilize the concentration
of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere at a desirable level. To assess whether the
proposed target is quite as ambitious as China argues, the paper next examines the issues
of whether it is conservative and whether there is a room for further increase. No doubt,
as long as China’s pledge is in the form of carbon intensity, the reliability of both
emissions and GDP data matters. The paper then addresses reliability issues concerning
China’s statistics on energy and GDP. Finally, while stressing paramount importance of
strict implementation and coordination of the policies and measures enacted to meet
China’s existing energy-saving goal in 2010, its proposed carbon intensity target in 2020
and whatever climate commitments beyond 2020 that China may take, the paper
concludes with a suggestion that international climate change negotiations need to focus
on 2030 as the targeted date to cap the greenhouse gas emissions of the world’s two
largest emitters in a legally binding global agreement.

2. China’s proposed carbon intensity target: ambitious or business as usual?
Under the Kyoto Protocol, greenhouse gas emissions targets of developed countries are
set against their historically observed levels. However, developing countries’ standards of
living are still very low in comparison with their industrialized counterparts, and they are
entitled to further development and economic growth. Thus, unlike developed countries,
their emissions targets, if any, must be linked to future, unobserved levels. Moreover,
while all countries face economic uncertainties as the recent financial crisis and global
economic downturn demonstrate, developing country economies tend to fluctuate more
than those of industrialized countries. This will lead to considerable uncertainties over
their economic growth rates and thus emissions projections. To mitigate the inherent
problems, intensity targets are proposed as a realistic and practical framework for
developing country participation (Baumert et al., 1999). This approach is considered
appealing to developing countries, in particular those rapidly growing developing
countries, because of its distinctive feature of managing the aforementioned economic
uncertainties.

2

See Zhang (2000b, 2009 and 2010a,b) for detailed discussion on China’s climate
strategies regarding the format and timeframe that it would take on climate commitments.
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Zhang (2000a,b) envision that China could make a voluntary commitment to total
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP at some point around 2020.3 However, it is not
until just prior to the Copenhagen climate summit that China pledged to cut its carbon
intensity by 40-45% by 2020 relative its 2005 levels. While this is consistent with
China’s longstanding opposition to hard emission caps on the ground that such limits will
restrict its economic growth, this marks a point of departure from its longstanding
position on its own climate actions. Wen Jiabao, China’s Prime Minister, made it clear at
Copenhagen that China’s pledges “are unconditional and they are not dependent on the
reduction targets of other nations” (Watts, 2009). Put another way, China will honor its
commitments regardless of the outcome of international negotiations. China is working
on its 12th five-year economic plan for the period 2011-2015, and the carbon intensity
target is expected to be incorporated as a domestic commitment for the first time into
China’s five-year economic plan.
While some question China’s willing action, real discussion has since focused on whether
such a pledge is ambitious or just represents business as usual (e.g., Qiu, 2009; Carraro
and Tovoni, 2010). China considers it very ambitious, whereas Western scholars (e.g.,
Levi, 2009) view it just business as usual based largely on the long-term historical trend
of China’s energy intensity. The issues then arrive: 1) does the proposed target represent
business as usual as some Western scholars argue? 2) is the proposed target quite as
ambitious as China argues?
Let us start with the first issue. There are several ways to evaluate how challenging this
proposed carbon intensity target is. One way is to see whether the proposed carbon
intensity goal for 2020 is as challenging as the energy-saving goals set in the current 11th
five-year economic blueprint. This involves two issues. One is rational for using energy
intensity reduction as a reference. Given the fixed CO2 emissions coefficients of fossil
fuels, which convert consumption of fossil fuels into CO2 emissions, and given that
China’s energy mix is coal-dominated, cutting China’s carbon intensity is in fact cutting
China’s energy intensity, as clearly indicated in Figure 1. So we can use measurable and
reported data on energy use in the recent years to infer the stringency of China’s
proposed carbon intensity target for 2020. Another issue requires the establishment of
why the current 20% energy-saving goal is considered very challenging. China sets a goal
of cutting energy use per unit of GDP by 20% by 2010 relative to its 2005 levels. In 2006,
the first year of this energy efficiency drive, while China reversed a rise in its energy
intensity in the first half of that year, energy intensity only declined by 1.79% over the
entire year. Although this decline is a first since 2003, it was far short of the targeted 4%.
Among the 31 Chinese provinces or equivalent, only Beijing met that energy-saving goal
in 2006, cutting its energy use per unit of GDP by 5.25%, followed by Tianjin, another
3

Zhang (2010b) is the expanded version of China country paper that I initially prepared
for the United Nations Development Programme project on Promoting Development
while Slowing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Growth. When the draft of that China country
paper was released, the Washington DC-based Resources for the Future made a press
release “Is China Taking Actions to Limit Its Greenhouse Gas Emissions?”, 15
September 1998.
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metropolitan city in China, with an energy intensity reduction of 3.98%, Shanghai by
3.71%, Zhejiang by 3.52% and Jiangsu by 3.50% (NBS et al., 2007). In 2007, despite
concerted efforts towards energy saving, the country cut its energy intensity by 4.04%
(NBS et al., 2009). There were still big variations in energy-saving performance among
the 31 Chinese provinces or equivalent. Beijing continued to take the lead, cutting its
energy intensity by 6%, followed by Tianjin by 4.9% and Shanghai by 4.66% (NBS et al.,
2008). This clearly indicated Beijing’s commitments to the 2008 Green Olympic Games.
In the meantime, however, there were seven provinces whose energy-saving
performances were below the national average. 2008 was the first year in which China
exceeded the overall annualized target (4.4%) for energy saving, cutting its energy
intensity by 4.59% (NBS et al., 2009). This was due partly to the economic crisis that
reduced overall demand, in particular the demand for energy-intensive products. Overall,
the energy intensity was cut by 14.38% in the first four years of the plan relative to its
2005 levels (Xinhua Net, 2010). In July 2010, China released its energy intensity number
for 2009, and its final energy intensity numbers for the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008,
which are revised based on the second nationwide economic census. Based on these
revised numbers, China’s energy intensity fell by 15.61% from 2006-2009 (NBS et al.,
2010). The country would meet its energy-saving goal if it could cut its energy intensity
by 4.39% in 2010. However, China’s energy use rose faster than its economic growth in
the first half of 2010, with seven provinces becoming even more energy intensive during
this period. This suggests that the country as a whole needs to accomplish the goal set for
the whole year only within a half year, with some provinces required to fill even big
remaining gaps during this period. Given the annual energy-saving rate of 5.25% during
the period 1980-2000 in which China achieved a quadrupling of its GDP while cutting its
energy intensity by about three quarters (Zhang, 2003), achieving such high energysaving rate within a half year poses a significant challenge for the country as well as for
those provinces that lagged behind schedule. To achieve the goal, it is widely reported
that several provinces issued a strict rotation of rolling blackouts for thousands of
factories that required them to shut down five days for every nine they operate. Clearly,
the local blackouts are not what the central government intended. While they were not
consistent with the national policy and were not rational, it seems that local governments
have little choice but to take such irrational measures in such a very short period of time.
Moreover, as further discussed in the next section, these reductions in China’s energy
intensity have already factored in the revisions of China’s official GDP data from the
second nationwide economic census, part of the government’s continuing efforts to
improve the quality of its statistics, whose accuracy has been questioned by both the
general public inside of China and many analysts both inside and outside of China. Such
revisions show that China’s economy grew faster and shifted more towards services than
the previously estimated, thus benefiting the energy intensity indicator. Even so, it will
still not be easy for China to achieve its own set energy-saving goal. If there were no
upward revisions of GDP data, it would be impossible at all to meet that target.
All this clearly indicates that even having picked low-hanging fruit by closing 60.06 GW
of small, inefficient coal-fired power plants in the past four years, ahead of the national
schedule to decommission 50 GW of smaller and older units in the five years through
2010, helped China to get to where it currently stands (Zhang, 2010a,c). This still leaves

5
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a big gap between the current overall performance and the 20% energy-saving goal.
However, those low-hanging fruit opportunities can only be captured once. The new
carbon intensity target set for 2020 requires an additional 20-25% on top of the existing
target. Achieving this will clearly be even more challenging and costly for China.
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Figure 1 China’s Energy Intensity Index and Carbon Intensity Index (1980=100),
1980-2007
Sources: Drawn based on China Statistical Yearbook, various years, and Zhang (1997).

Another way is to assess how substantially this carbon intensity target drives China’s
emissions below its projected baseline levels, and whether China does its part as required
in order to fulfill a coordinated global commitment to stabilize the concentration of
greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere at the desirable level. The World Energy
Outlook (WEO) 2009 (IEA, 2009) has incorporated many policies into the baseline
projection that were not incorporated in the WEO 2007 (IEA, 2007). This projection puts
China’s baseline carbon emissions at 9.6 GtCO2 in 2020. Under the ambitious 450 parts
per million (ppm) of CO2 equivalent scenario, China’s CO2 emissions are projected to be
8.4 GtCO2 by 2020, 1.2 GtCO2 less than that in the baseline (IEA, 2009). Now let us put
China’s proposed carbon intensity target into perspective. The calculations of the paper
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show that cutting the carbon intensity by 40-45% over the period 2006-2020 would bring
reductions of 0.46-1.2 GtCO2 in 2020, which are equivalent to a deviation of 4.8-12.7%
below the WEO 2009 baseline set for China in 2020.4 Two key points need to be made.
First, even the lower end of that range does not represent business as usual, because it
represents a deviation of 4.8% below the WEO 2009 baseline levels. Second, if China
would be able to meet its own proposed 45% carbon intensity cut, the country would cut
emissions of 1.2 GtCO2 in 2020 from its baseline levels as is required under the
ambitious 450 ppm scenario. That is equivalent to 31.6% of what the world would need
to do in 2020 under the 450 ppm scenario, a share higher than China’s share of the
world’s total CO2 emissions (28% in 2020). Clearly, the high end of China’s target, if met,
aligns with the specified obligation that China needs to fulfill under the 450 ppm scenario.
The previous two points clearly show that the proposed carbon intensity target does not
just represent BAU as some Western scholars have argued. Now let us see whether the
proposed target is quite as ambitious as China argues. This involves assessing the issues
of whether it is conservative and whether there is a room for further increase. Arguably,
China will claim to meet its carbon intensity target as long as it cuts its carbon intensity
by 40% over the period 2006-2020. This raises the stringency issue of this proposed
intensity reduction. IEA (2009) estimates that national policies under consideration in
China would bring reductions of about 1 GtCO2 in 2020. This suggests a carbon intensity
reduction of 43.6% in 2020 relative to its 2005 levels, implying that the low end of
China’s carbon intensity target is conservative. Is there a big deal to emphasize this few
percentage differences? It depends really on which country is in question. It may not
matter much for a small country, but for China it matters a great deal. Given that China is
already the world’s largest carbon emitter and its emissions are projected to rise to 28%
of the world’s total in 2020 (IEA, 2009), that 3.6% difference in reductions for China will
translate into more than a 10% difference in reductions for the world as a whole in that
year.
Is there a room for China to increase its own proposed carbon intensity reduction of 4045% by 2020?. It would be hard, but not impossible. Given that many of the policies
considered in the WEO 2009 that will cut emissions of 1 GtCO2 in 2020 from its baseline
levels are not particularly climate-motivated, China could accelerate the speed of, and
scale up the implementation, of such policies and enact additional policies with explicit
4

Given China’s carbon intensity pledge, baseline matters here, because the extent to
which it drives China’s emissions below its projected baseline depends on the baseline
setting. If those policies under consideration have not been incorporated into the
underlying baseline projection, that will lead to higher baseline level than would
otherwise have been the case, thus resulting in a higher percentage deviation. This has
been illustrated by McKibbin et al. (2010), which assume China’s carbon intensity
reduction of 26% under the baseline, much lower than about 40% under the WEO 2009
baseline (IEA, 2009) and 45% under the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2009)
baseline. As would be expected, McKibbin et al. find that China’s carbon intensity pledge
amounts to a deviation of 22% relative to the baseline in 2020, much higher than that
derived from the aforementioned WEO 2009 study.
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considerations of climate mitigation and adaptation. This would bring additional
reductions in China’s carbon intensity.
What then is the yardstick or bound on the energy or carbon intensity of the Chinese
economy in 2020? One way is to set it based on China’s own medium- and long-term
energy conservation plan. Such a plan sets up a quantitative energy-saving target for 2020,
and measured in tons of coal equivalent per ten thousand Yuan in 1990 price, it requires
China’s energy intensity to be cut from 2.68 in 2002 to 1.54 in 2020, with an annual
energy saving rate of 3% between 2003-2020 (NDRC, 2004). This suggests a reduction
of China’s energy intensity by 42.5% in 2020, relative to 2002 levels. With China’s rising
energy intensity between 2002-2005 as shown in Figure 1, to meet this energy-saving
goal under the medium- and long-term energy conservation plan requires China’s energy
intensity to be cut by more than 42.5%, relative to its 2005 levels. It should be pointed
out that this energy-saving plan was set at a time when China faced much less severe
environmental stress, energy security concerns and international pressure to take
mitigation actions than it is now confronted with. This suggests that China should now
aim for an even more ambitious energy-saving goal than it was envisioned under the
energy-saving plan set in 2004. Another way is to infer potential level based on historical
trend of energy saving. Assuming that China’s economy grows at the annual average rate
of 7.6% per year used for the WEO 2009 and that China is able to limit the growth of
energy use to half the growth rate of the economy between 2006 and 2020, then China’s
energy use per unit of GDP would be cut by 42% by 2020, relative to its 2005 levels.
Given China’s economic growth over the period 2005-2009, this assumed rate of
economic growth is very conservative in China’s context. Assuming the more likely
growth rate of 8% per year between 2006 and 2020 and all others remaining unchanged,
then China’s energy intensity would be cut by 43% by 2020, relative to its 2005 levels.
This back-of-the-envelope calculation assumes an income elasticity of 0.5 between 2006
and 2020. While China was able to accomplish that during the 1980s and 1990s, going
ahead, we should not naturally expect a return to that level, given that China had
experienced faster energy consumption growth than economic growth between 2002 and
2005 and, as discussed earlier, is encountering great difficulty meeting its 20% energy
intensity target. Thus, a 42-43% cut in China’s energy intensity by 2020 relative to 2005
levels can be considered as an upper bound on China’s energy intensity target. With
carbon-free energy meeting 7.1% of China’s total energy needs in 2005 (National Bureau
of Statistics of China, 2009) and that share mandated to be increased to 15%, this 42-43%
cut in energy intensity is equivalent to a 50-51% cut in carbon intensity between 2006
and 2020, implying that there is a room for China to increase its own proposed carbon
intensity reduction of 40-45% by 2020. China should therefore aim for a 46-50% cut in
its carbon intensity over the period 2006-2020. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) (2007) recommends developing countries as a group to limit their
greenhouse gas emissions to 15-30% below their baseline levels by 2020. This 46-50%
carbon intensity reduction will lead to China’s emissions reductions of 15-21% compared
with its baseline levels in 2020. That will put China’s absolute emissions reductions very
much within this IPCC’s recommended level.

8
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3. Meeting China’s carbon intensity: the reliability issue of China’s statistics on
energy and GDP
Having an ambitious commitment is one thing. Fulfilling that commitment is another
issue. While the level of China’s commitments is crucial in affecting the level and
ambition of commitments from other countries, it is more important to know whether the
claimed reductions in carbon emissions are real. This raises reliability issues concerning
China’s statistics on energy and GDP.
China is not known for the reliability of its statistics (e.g., Rawski, 2001). China’s refusal
to budge on U.S. and other industrialized country’s demands for greater transparency and
checks at Copenhagen was cited by negotiator after negotiator as a key block to reaching
a deal (Graham-Harrison, 2009). As long as China’s pledges are in the form of carbon
intensity, the reliability of both emissions and GDP data matters.
Assuming the fixed CO2 emissions coefficients that convert consumption of fossil fuels
into CO2 emissions, the reliability of emissions data depends very much on energy
consumption data. Unlike the energy data in the industrial product tables in the China
Statistical Yearbook, the statistics on primary energy production and consumption are
usually revised in the year after their first appearance. As would be expected, the
adjustments made to production statistics are far smaller than those made to consumption
statistics, because it is easier to collect information on the relatively small number of
energy producers than the large number of energy consumers. Table 1 shows the
preliminary and final values for total primary energy consumption and coal consumption
in China between 1990 and 2008. Until 1996 revisions of total energy use figures were
several times smaller than in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The preliminary figures for
total energy use in 1999-2001 were revised upwards by 8-10%. In all three years, these
adjustments were driven by upward revisions of 8-13% made to the coal consumption
figures to reflect the unreported coal production mainly from small, inefficient and highly
polluting coal mines. These coal mines were ordered to shut down through a widelypublicized nationwide campaign beginning in 1998, although many had reopened
because in many cases local governments had pushed back to preserve local jobs and
generate tax revenues as well as personal payoffs. In recent years, preliminary figures for
energy use are very close to the final reported ones.
Similarly, China first releases its preliminary GDP figures and then revises them. These
revised GDP figures for the years 2005-2008 are further verified based on the second
agricultural census released in February 2008 and the second nationwide economic
census released in December 2009. With upward revisions of both GDP and the share of
services, there is a big variation between the preliminary value for China’s energy
intensity and the final reported one. As shown in Table 2, such revisions lead to a
differential between preliminary and final values as large as 123% for the energy
intensity in 2006. With the government’s continuing efforts to improve the quality of
China’s statistics, there is a downward trend of such a differential as a result of the
revisions.

9
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Table 1 Preliminary and Final Values for Total Primary Energy Consumption and
Coal Consumption in China, 1990-2008a
Year

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Total primary energy consumption
Preliminary Final
Adjustment
value
value
(%)
(Mtce)
(Mtce)
987.03
980.00
0.7
1037.83
1023.00
1.4
1091.70
1089.00
0.2
1159.93
1117.68
3.8
1227.37
1227.37
0.0
1311.76
1290.00
1.7
1389.48
1388.11
0.1
1377.98
1420.00
-3.0
1322.14
1360.00
-2.8
1338.31
1220.00
9.7
1385.53
1280.00
8.2
1431.99
1320.00
8.5
1517.97
1480.00
2.6
1749.90
1678.00
4.3
2032.27
1970.00
3.2
2246.82
2233.19
0.6
2462.70
2462.70
0.0
2655.83
2655.83
0.0
2850.00b

Total coal consumption
Preliminary Final
Adjustment
value
value
(%)
(Mtce)
(Mtce)
752.12
1.5
740.88
789.79
1.6
777.48
826.42
1.3
815.66
866.47
6.5
813.67
920.53
0.0
920.53
978.57
1.1
967.50
1037.94
-0.3
1041.08
988.01
-5.3
1043.70
920.21
-5.5
973.76
924.77
13.0
818.62
939.39
9.5
857.60
955.14
8.0
884.40
1006.41
2.9
978.28
1196.93
6.3
1125.94
1381.94
3.6
1333.69
1552.55
0.9
1538.67
1709.11
0.0
1709.11
1845.80
0.0
1845.80
1957.95b

Notes: Mtce (million tons of coal equivalent).
a
National Bureau of Statistics of China is expected to adjust both preliminary and final
values for energy and coal uses to make all statistics consistent, based on the second
nationwide economic census. But such an adjustment in a comparable way will have little
effect on a difference between their preliminary and final values.
b
Data on energy and coal consumption in 2008 are preliminary value.
Source: Based on China Statistical Yearbook, various years.
From the preceding discussion, it follows that GDP figures are even more crucial to the
impacts on the energy or carbon intensity than are energy consumption and emissions
data. At Copenhagen, China eventually compromised to agree to open its emissions data
to international consultation and analysis. The EU has identified building a robust and
transparent emissions and performance accounting framework as a key element of
implementing the Copenhagen Accord (European Commission, 2010). How all this will
be worked out remains to be seen. China has not agreed to opening its GDP figures to
international consultation and analysis. But as long as China’s commitments are in the
form of carbon intensity, establishing a robust and transparent emissions and performance
accounting framework is helpful, but not enough to remove international concern about
the reliability of China’s commitments. The aforementioned revisions of China’s GDP
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figures reflect part of the government’s continuing efforts to improve the accuracy and
reliability of China’s statistics on economic activity. They have nothing to do with the
energy intensity indicator, and are certainly not being calculated to make that indicator
look good to the government’s advantage, although practically they do benefit this
indicator. But such revisions have huge implications for meeting China’s existing energysaving goal in 2010 and its proposed carbon intensity target in 2020.

Table 2 A Reduction in China’s Energy Intensity: Preliminary Value versus Final
Valuea
Year

Preliminary
value (%)

Revised
value (%)

Re-revised
value (%)

Final value
(%)

Differential
between
preliminary
and final
values (%)

2006

1.23
(March 2007)
3.27
(March 2008)
4.59
(30 June 2009)
3.98c
(March 2010)

1.33
(12 July 2007)
3.66
(14 July 2008)
5.20b
(25 Dec. 2009)
3.23d
(15 July 2010)

1.79
(14 July 2008)
4.04
(30 June 2009)

2.74
(15 July 2010)
5.04
(15 July 2010)
5.20
(15 July 2010)

122.8

2007
2008
2009

54.1
13.3

3.61
(15 July 2010)

Notes: a The dates when the corresponding data were released are in parentheses.
b
Based on China’s revised 2008 GDP from the second nationwide economic census,
which raised the growth rate of GDP to 9.6% from the previously reported 9% for that
year and the share of services in GDP.
c
Own calculation based on the National Development and Reform Commission’s
reporting that China’s energy intensity was cut by 14.38% in the first four years of the
11th five-year plan relative to its 2005 levels (Xinhua Net, 2010).
d
Own calculation based on China’s energy intensity number for 2009, and its final
energy intensity numbers for the years 2005 and 2008 (NBS et al., 2010).
Sources: Based on NBS et al. (2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010) and Xinhua Net (2010).

4. Conclusions
Concerned about a range of environmental problems and health risks from burning fossil
fuels and steeply rising oil imports, China has incorporated for the first time in its fiveyear economic plan an input indicator as a constraint – requiring that energy use per unit
of GDP be cut by 20% during the 11th five-year period running from 2006 to 2010.
Combined with great pressure both inside and outside international climate negotiations
to be more ambitious in limiting its greenhouse gas emissions, just prior to the
Copenhagen climate summit, China pledged to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45% by
2020 relative its 2005 levels to help to reach an international climate change agreement at
Copenhagen or beyond. This unilateral commitment clearly indicates China’s
determination to further decouple its energy use and carbon emissions from economic
11
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growth. The proposed carbon intensity target certainly does not just represent business as
usual as some Western scholars have argued. On the other hand, that target may not be
quite as ambitious as China argues. Given that China is already the world’s largest carbon
emitter and its share in the world’s total emissions continues to rise, even a few additional
percentage reductions in its carbon intensity translate into a significant amount of global
emissions reductions. It is hard, but is not impossible for China to increase its own
proposed carbon intensity reduction target. We suggest that China should aim for a 4650% cut in its carbon intensity over the period 2006-2020. That will put China’s absolute
emissions reductions very much within the IPCC’s recommended level for developing
countries.
Even if China would raise the target to the level seen as ambitious, that just presents a
goodwill of China. It does not necessarily suggest that that target can be met, in particular
given that China has to date had limited success in achieving its own 20% energy-saving
goal. Moreover, China has faced great difficulty ensuring that local governments act in
accordance with centrally-directed policies. As a common practice, the central
government of China sets a national energy intensity goal. This national goal is then
decomposed at each province or equivalent. Each province or equivalent further
decomposes its energy saving goals at prefecture and county levels. The ability of, and
incentives for, lower-level governments to effectively implement energy-saving and
pollution-cutting policies are therefore critical, particularly since the last three decades of
economic reforms have witnessed a shift in the control over resources and decision
making to local governments. As the energy-saving performance of the 31 Chinese
provinces or equivalent over the first four years of 11th five-year plan had shown, there
were big variations (NBS et al., 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010). Those provinces or
equivalent whose energy-saving performances were below the national average are
clearly dragging their feet on meeting the national energy-saving goal. Given that the
devolution of decision making to local governments has placed environmental
stewardship in the hands of local officials who are more concerned with economic
growth, local government’s cooperation is crucial to the overall outcomes. To that end,
the central government needs to set right incentives to get local governments’ cooperation.
One way to ensure that local officials are held accountable for energy saving and
pollution cutting in their regions is developing criteria that incorporate energy
conservation and environmental performance into the overall evaluation of local officials’
performances and applying that criteria consistently to ensure energy saving and
pollution cutting in a rational way. Alleviating the financial burden of local governments
is another avenue to incentivize them not to eye on economic growth alone. The central
government really needs to cultivate steady and sizeable sources of revenues for local
governments. Enacting property taxes or real estate taxes for local governments is
urgently needed. Broadening the current coverage of resource taxation and significantly
increasing the levied level would also help to increase local government’s revenues while
conserving resources and preserving the environment. The new resource tax levied on
crude oil and natural gas in Xinjiang since 1 June 2010, based on revenues rather than
existing extracted volume, is the first step in the right direction.
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Clearly, China’s proposed carbon intensity target not only needs to be seen as ambitious,
but more importantly it needs to be credible, although other countries like to see China to
adopt an ambitious target rather than cautioning it against offering something that China
might not be able to deliver. Ascertaining this credibility involves two issues. One is
whether the claimed carbon emissions reductions themselves are real. This raises
reliability issues concerning China’s statistics on energy and GDP, given that China is not
known for the reliability of its statistics. China’s compromise at Copenhagen to agree to
open its emissions data to international consultation and analysis is a start, although it
remains to be seen how this will work in practice. But as long as China’s commitments
are in the form of carbon intensity, establishing a robust and transparent emissions and
performance accounting framework is helpful, but not enough to remove international
concern about the reliability of China’s commitments. The revisions of China’s GDP
figures and energy consumption in recent years show that GDP figures are even more
crucial to the impacts on the energy or carbon intensity than are energy consumption and
emissions data. While they are certainly not being calculated to make the energy intensity
indicator look good to the government’s advantage, such revisions have huge
implications for meeting China’s existing energy-saving goal in 2010 and its proposed
carbon intensity target in 2020.
Another issue is whether China is really able to achieve its target, given that China has
faced and continues to face great difficulty meeting its own set 20% energy-saving goal
in 2010. Setting the target and enacting the corresponding policies and measures to meet
that goal signal the goodwill and determination of China’s leaders. To actually achieve
the desired outcomes, however, requires strict implementation and coordination of these
policies and measures.5 China has mostly relied on administrative means to achieve its
current 20% energy-saving goal for 2010. As discussed in the paper, the country has to
date had limited success in meeting that goal. But with rising domestic energy demand
and increasing difficulty further cutting energy and carbon intensities, putting a price on
carbon is considered a crucial step for China to harness the market to reduce its energy
consumption and carbon emissions and genuinely transit into a low-carbon economy. A
domestic carbon trading scheme, if established, will serve as a cost-effective supplement
to costly administrative means on which China is mainly relying to meet its current
energy saving goal.6
5

See Zhang (2010c) for further discussion on these policies and measures.
The key issue is the scope and coverage of that carbon trading scheme. Given the fact
that the costs of abating carbon emissions differ significantly among emissions sources
cross provinces and sectors, having broad coverage of emissions sources from all
industries nationwide creates a means of obtaining low-cost abatement options, thus
minimizing the total cost of complying with the national energy-saving and emissions
goals. This is an ideal option. In practice, however, a carbon trading in China would have
to start from selected sectors or regions, although the limited scope and coverage will
reduce its cost-effectiveness, because China needs a reasonable length of time to develop
and operate a national carbon market. Take the establishment of an emissions trading
scheme as a case in point. Even for the U.S. SO2 Allowance Trading Program, the entire
process from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency beginning to compile the data
6
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From the preceding discussion, there is no doubt that achieving this carbon intensity
target poses a significant challenge for China. However, even if China would meet that
carbon intensity target, it still cannot remove international concern about the reliability of
its commitments. As long as China’s commitments differ in form from that of the U.S.
and other major greenhouse gas emitters, China is constantly confronted with both
criticism on its carbon intensity commitment being less stringent and the threats of trade
measures whenever the U.S. Senate is shaping its climate bill, given that the inclusion of
border measures is widely considered the “price” for passing any U.S. legislation capping
its greenhouse gas emissions (Zhang, 2010b). Moreover, the U.S. Senate can always take
China as an excuse for its own failure to pass a long-awaited bill to cap U.S. greenhouse
gas emissions.
This dilemma is partly attributed to flaws in current international climate negotiations,
which have been focused on commitments on the two targeted dates: 2020 and 2050
(Zhang 2010b). However, with the commitment period only up to 2020, there is a very
little room left for the U.S. and China, although for reasons very different from each other.
The IPCC calls for cutting global greenhouse gas emissions at least in half by 2050. To
achieve that goal, the IPCC fourth assessment report recommends that global greenhouse
gas emissions should peak by 2020 at the latest and then turn downward in order to avoid
dangerous climate change consequences, calling for developed countries to cut their
greenhouse gas emissions by 25-40% by 2020 relative to their 1990 levels (IPCC, 2007).
This recommendation was incorporated into the Bali Roadmap at the United Nations
Climate Summit in 2007. This seems a logical choice. Once the long-term goal (namely
target for 2050) is set, one needs a mid-term goal to help facilitate the long-term one.
From then, the negotiations on industrialized countries’ commitments have been on what
emissions reduction targets would be in 2020.
However, 2020 is just around the corner. More importantly, this date does not
accommodate well the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters, namely the U.S. and
China. Because the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, it has not made any
substantial preparations to cut emissions as other Kyoto-constrained industrialized
countries have done over the past decade. Whether you like it or not, this is a political
reality. It is very hard for a unprepared country like the U.S. to take on a substantial

for its allocation database in 1989 to publishing its final allowance allocations in March
1993 took almost four years. For the first phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme,
the entire process took almost two years from the EU publishing the Directive
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading on 23 July 2003 to
it approving the last national allocation plan for Greece on 20 June 2005. For developing
countries like China with very weak environmental institutions and that do not have
dependable data on emissions, fuel uses and outputs for installations, this allocation
process is expected to take much longer than what experienced in the U.S. and the EU.
The experience suggests that a carbon trading scheme in China is initially of limited
scope and coverage.
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emissions cut in 2020 as developing countries have demanded, although it should on a
moral ground.
In the meantime, China overtook the U.S. to become the world’s largest greenhouse gas
emitter in 2007, at least twenty years earlier than what was estimated by the U.S. EIA
(2004) as late as 2004. The IEA (2009) estimates that about half of the growth of global
energy-related CO2 emissions until 2030 will come from China. Combined with huge
trade deficit with China, the U.S. has pushed for China to take on emissions caps as early
as 2020. Otherwise, the goods from China to U.S. markets will be subject to carbon
tariffs. However, as argued in Zhang (2009 and 2010b), the year 2020 is not a realistic
date for China to take on the absolute emissions cap, because its carbon emissions would
be still on the climbing trajectories beyond 2030, even if some energy saving policies and
measures have been factored into such projections. Meanwhile, taking on something for
2050 seems too far away for politicians. If the commitment period were extended to 2030,
it would really open up the possibility for the U.S. and China to make the commitments
that each wants from the other in the same form, although the scale of reductions would
differ from each other. By 2030, the U.S. will be able to commit to much deeper emission
cuts that China and other developing countries have demanded, while, as argued in Zhang
(2009 and 2010b), China would have approached the threshold to take on the absolute
emission cap that the U.S. and other industrialized countries have long asked for.
Being aware of his proposed provisional target in 2020 well below what is internationally
expected from the U.S., President Obama announced a provisional target of a 42%
reduction below 2005 levels in 2030 to demonstrate the U.S. continuing commitments
and leadership to find a global solution to the threat of climate change. While the U.S.
proposed level of emission reductions for 2030 is still not ambitious enough, President
Obama inadvertently points to the right direction of international climate negotiations.
They need to look at the targeted date of 2030. If international negotiations could lead to
much deeper emission cuts for developed countries as well as the absolute emission caps
for major developing countries in 2030, that would significantly reduce the legitimacy of
the U.S. proposed carbon tariffs and, if implemented, their prospect for withstanding a
challenge before WTO. That will also alleviate concern about when China’s greenhouse
gas emissions peak and what China is going to do in what format. More importantly, it
really opens the possibility to cap the greenhouse gas emissions of the world’s two largest
emitters in a legally binding global agreement.
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